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Abstract
We present here the first work to propose different mechanisms for
hiding data in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP).
This is a very popular instant messaging protocol used by many messaging
platforms such as Google Talk, Cisco, LiveJournal and many others. Our
paper describes how to send a secret message from one XMPP client to
another, without raising the suspicion of any intermediaries. The meth-
ods described primarily focus on using the underlying protocol as a means
for steganography, unlike other related works that try to hide data in the
content of instant messages. In doing so, we provide a more robust means
of data hiding and additionally offer some preliminary analysis of its gen-
eral security, in particular against entropic-based steganalysis.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Steganography
Steganography is the science and art of exchanging hidden messages in such a
way that nobody, apart from the sender and the intended recipient, suspects
the existence of any hidden data. The word steganography comes from the
Greek words Steganos meaning “covered or protected” and Graphei meaning
“writing”.
Unlike cryptography, steganography deals exclusively with hiding the infor-
mation’s very presence. Instead of making the data unreadable, steganography
aims to completely hide this data. An ideal steganographic message will look
identical to a regular clean message, and should raise no suspicion [1].
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1.1.1 History
The Greek historian Herodotus tells us about the revolt in Ionia (ca. 499 BCE),
where Histiaeus shaved the head of his most trusted slave, and tattooed a mes-
sage onto it. He then waited for his hair to grow back before sending him to
Aristagoras. Through this communication, Histiaeus sparked a revolt against
the Persians [2, p81].
Another case of the early use of steganography, also told by Herodotus, was
that of Demaratus. He hid messages by engraving them on wooden tablets, and
then covering them with wax [2, p81-82].
1.1.2 Steganalysis
Steganalysis is “the art of detecting and decoding messages that have been
hidden steganographically” [3, p546]. The most basic goal of steganalysis is
to determine whether or not the message may have an embedded “payload”, at
which point the main goal of steganography, which is to communicate secretly, is
defeated. Further goals of steganalysis generally involve determining the means
used to hide the data, estimation of the amount of hidden data and, ultimately,
recovery of this hidden data.
Steganalysis is generally carried out by a party, commonly named a warden.
The warden is someone who is free to access all messages exchanged. Wardens
can be categorised [4] into two main types:
Passive warden examines all the data being exchanged, but does not inter-
vene unless something has flagged up its suspicion.
Active warden changes all data dynamically as the message passes through
its network. This is done to try to remove any hidden content, regardless of
whether or not he detects anything suspicious. This makes perfect sense in
some scenarios, and a similar approach is known to have taken place during
WWII. Many letters from soldiers to their families were opened and reworded
so as to deliver the same message, destroying any hidden message. Legend has
it that, one such letter was answered with the revealing question: “Is father
dead or deceased?” [5].
1.2 Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)
The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol is an XML streaming protocol
which allows for the exchange of messages and presence. 1 The decentralised
architecture of XMPP allows each organisation to take control of their own
domain, whilst still allowing inter-domain communication. The protocol relies
on XML streams as a medium to transfer data. This allows any interested party
to develop custom functionality over the existing protocol. This extensibility
and decentralisation makes the protocol very flexible and attractive in real life
settings. The multitude of clients, servers and code libraries available makes
it one of the more popular choices for companies to base their applications on,
making it a de facto industry standard.
Some of the larger, and better known deployments of XMPP are:
1Presence indicates the status of the user, whether he/she is online, away, or busy.
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• Google – The Google Talk service is based on XMPP. 2
• Facebook – Facebook announced that they would support XMPP for their
chat services in 2008 [6, 7]. 3
• Cisco – Cisco uses XMPP in all of their messaging and presence technolo-
gies [8].
• LiveJournal – LiveJournal Talk uses XMPP as a protocol for chat and
posting updates to the LiveJournal service [9].
• BBC Radio LiveText – LiveText [10] uses an XMPP extension XEP-0124:
Bidirectional-streams Over Synchronous HTTP[11] to push live text with
its radio stream.4
The XMPP is defined by two ‘Internet Standard’ documents. These are RFC
6120: XMPP: Core [12], which defines the core XML streaming technology, and
RFC 6121: XMPP: Instant Messaging and Presence [13], which defines the
messaging and presence protocols.
2 Proposed Covert Channels
Covert channels are so called because they are hidden communication pathways
within legitimate communications. They typically make use of certain proper-
ties of a medium (quite frequently high redundancy, but also others) in such a
way that it makes the exchange of hidden communication possible [14]. Covert
channels sometimes take advantage of the fact that communication channels
have frequently large overheads, and in many implementations need to contin-
uously transfer metadata to keep them open.
XMPP is an example of such a communication protocol, which needs to
transfer metadata in each message to keep the channel open. This metadata is
a convenient place to hide information.
<message from=’adam@test.com’ to=’bart@test.com’ type=’chat’
id=’7df1ddbe’><body>Message.</body></message>
Example 1: An XMPP Message.
Example 1 depicts a very simple XMPP message with no hidden data. We
can compare this to the examples shown below, which illustrates the exchange
of hidden data.
The covert channels we found and propose are described and analysed below:
2Google has begun phasing out XMPP in favour of their own proprietary hangouts protocol.
3In 2009 chat.facebook.com was detected as running a modified version of the ejabberd
XMPP server to interface between XMPP clients and Facebook servers.
4The BBC LiveText service is an example of XMPP used to broadcast data instead of
chat.
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2.1 Type Attribute
One such place to hide data is in the ‘type’ attribute. This attribute is not used
by the server and is passed as-is to the receiver. This makes it an ideal place to
store information.
2.1.1 Changing the case of the value of the type attribute
Since the server does not change the value of this attribute, we can change the
case of the value in the type attribute (from ‘chat’ to ‘CHAT’ or ‘ChAT’) to
indicate set or clear bits.
<message from=’adam@test.com’ to=’bart@test.com’ type=’CHAT’
id=’7df1ddbe’><body>Message.</body></message>
Example 2: One hidden bit coded by the case of the type attribute
2.1.2 Changing the value of the type attribute
Another method of hiding data in this attribute is by using one of the five valid
values defined in the XMPP Specification. This method allows us to encode up
to a maximum of 2 bits per message. However, we recommend using only two
of these values ‘normal’ and ‘chat’ to encode just 1 bit per message. This is
because the other two options, ‘error’ and ‘headline’ are not commonly used in
chat messages and could easily raise suspicion.
<message from=’adam@test.com’ to=’bart@test.com’ type=’normal’
id=’7df1ddbe’><body>Message.</body></message>
Example 3: One hidden bit coded in the value of the type attribute.
2.1.3 Presence of a type attribute
Since the XMPP specification (RFC 6121 [13, subsection 5.2.2]) does not make
the use of this attribute mandatory, we can code another bit in the presence or
absence of this attribute in every XMPP message.
<message from=’adam@test.com’ to=’bart@test.com’
id=’7df1ddbe’><body>Message.</body></message>
Example 4: One hidden bit coded in the presence of the type attribute.
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2.2 id Attribute
Each XMPP message is allowed to have an id attribute. This can be any
string identifying the individual message tag. It is usually implemented using
some sort of counter, numeric or alphanumeric (usually coded in hexadecimal)
which is incremented after each message, providing a unique identifier for each
message. This channel too can be steganographically exploited in multiple ways
as described below:
2.2.1 Least significant bits
The only requirement for these identifiers is that each of them should be unique.
The XMPP specification does not describe an order in which they must occur.
We can use the least significant bits of this identifier as an additional channel
to hide data.
An easy way to implement this would be to discard identifier values until
the LSBs match the data to be sent. Simply doing this may look suspicious as
the id value will change randomly with each message. A more subtle and much
more secure implementation would use the discarded identifier values to send
messages to a third party (a decoy XMPP client, who is not participating in
the steganographic exchange). This way, each identifier is used exactly once,
making it much harder to detect this type of covert communication.
<message from=’adam@test.com’ to=’bart@test.com’ type=’chat’
id=’7df1ddbf’><body>Message.</body></message>
Example 5: One hidden bit using the LSB of the id attribute.
2.2.2 Case
Another possible channel that makes use of this id attribute employs some of
the inherent redundancy in text strings, in this particular proposal, its case.
Since the ID is implemented as a string of characters, we can codify some data
as the case of the individual characters in the string. We can use this to code
multiple bits per message.
Using multiple cases in the same id is not recommended, as it may flag
unnecessary suspicion. Hence, it is best to stick to one case for the whole id
and encode just one bit of data in each message.
<message from=’adam@test.com’ to=’bart@test.com’ type=’chat’
id=’7DF1DDBE’><body>Message.</body></message>
Example 6: One bit coded in the case of the id attribute.
2.3 xml:lang Attribute
Since XMPP relies on XML as its core technology, some of the metadata proper-
ties in different XML specifications made their way into XMPP. The ‘xml:lang’
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[15] attribute is one of these properties, used to determine the language the
message is written in, such as English (en) or French (fr). Some channels that
can use this property are:
2.3.1 The presence of the xml:lang attribute
This attribute is yet another optional attribute which forms part of a valid
XMPP message, and one bit of data can be hidden using the presence or absence
of this field. The prototype tool developed while doing this research uses this
channel to encode one bit of data.
<message from=’adam@test.com’ to=’bart@test.com’ type=’chat’
id=’7df1ddbe’><body xml:lang=’en’>Message.</body></message>
Example 7: One bit encoded in the presence of the xml:lang attribute.
2.3.2 The value of the xml:lang attribute
This channel can be extended by assigning a value to the language code in this
attribute. This way, using the redundancy in language codes that represent
roughly the same language (en-GB, en-US, etc.), we can encode some data.
<message from=’adam@test.com’ to=’bart@test.com’ type=’chat’
id=’7df1ddbe’><body xml:lang=’en-GB’>Message.</body></message>
Example 8: One hidden bit in the value of the xml:lang attribute.
2.4 Body Contents
The body of an XMPP message is where the actual content of the message is
contained.
Below we list and describe a few of the most practical covert channels em-
ploying message contents as a carrier medium.
2.4.1 Leading and Trailing Space
The leading and trailing space redundancy is a way of encoding 2 bits of data
per message per body element. This is done by first trimming5 the body of
the message, then adding a space character to the beginning and/or end of the
message, each encoding one bit of data, in a way very similar to that used by
the well-know steganographic tool SNOW [16].
5trimming is a string manipulation technique which removes any leading and trailing white-
space.
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<message from=’adam@test.com’ to=’bart@test.com’ type=’chat’
id=’7df1ddbe’><body> Message.</body></message>
Example 9: One bit hidden in the leading space.
2.4.2 Replacing Words With Synonyms
Another possibility for hiding data in the body of a message is replacing words
with their synonyms or abbreviations. This takes advantage of redundancy in
the language being used to encode data.
This feature can be implemented as a dictionary of words and their corre-
sponding synonyms. We can then encode some bits depending on which equiva-
lent word from a list of synonyms we use at a given time. This implementation
can only be detected by performing a heuristic check on the language used in
each message [17], but any such technique will very likely suffer from many false
positives and poor overall accuracy.
<message from=’adam@test.com’ to=’bart@test.com’ type=’chat’
id=’7df1ddbe’><body>Msg.</body></message>
Example 10: One bit hidden by replacing a message with its abbreviation.
2.4.3 Spelling Mistakes
Spelling mistakes are a common occurrence in quickly typed chat messages. We
can take advantage of some commonly known mistakes to encode some data in
whether the word is spelt correctly or not.
This channel’s implementation would be quite similar to the synonyms chan-
nel described above, in that it would also use a dictionary to encode data and
does not have any trivial and highly accurate steganalytic technique.
<message from=’adam@test.com’ to=’bart@test.com’ type=’chat’
id=’7df1ddbe’><body>Mesage.</body></message>
Example 11: One bit coded by a spelling mistake.
3 Implementing Covert Channels
We have created a proof of concept tool, called StegMPP6 to implement steganog-
raphy over some of the covert channels described in previous sections, and to
test their capacity and security. It has a minimalist graphical interface and only
implements the bits of XMPP strictly needed to send and receive messages.
Figure 1, 2 and 3 showcase the user interface of StegMPP.
6Available at http://patuck.github.io/StegMPP/
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Figure 1: The StegMPP UI
Figure 2: The Connection Settings UI
The steganography sub-system of our tool encrypts and embeds user data
into different covert channels. These are listed below:
• Value of the id attribute.
• Presence of the xml:lang attribute.
• Presence of the type attribute.
• Presence of a leading space in the body.
• Presence of a trailing space in the body.
• type attribute case.7
4 Analysis of Covert Channels
Steganalysis of these covert channels is performed by simulating a warden. An
active warden is not suitable for some of the covert channels described here,
7This attribute was finally removed from StegMPP because of known security flaws de-
scribed in the next section.
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Figure 3: The Steganography Settings UI
because we have found that arbitrarily and/or randomly changing values in some
of these channels, would hamper the communication of regular users. This is
why a passive warden is, in the following, preferred to model a realistic setting
to monitor the exchanged messages.
Wardens can be further divided into two kinds, depending on whether they
take into account previous states of the protocol:
4.1 Stateless Warden
A stateless warden is one that treats every message independently and does not
take into account any of the previously seen messages. This type of warden is
easy to implement, as it only needs to compare each message to a static list of
definitions.
However this type of warden is only able to detect hidden data that is not
a valid XMPP message. Channels like the case of the ‘type’ attribute can
be detected as the RFC [13, subsection 5.2.2] specifies certain values, all of
which are in lower case. This makes finding hidden communications trivial as
any message with upper case values in its ‘type’ attribute can be immediately
categorised as suspicious.
4.2 Stateful Warden
A stateful warden is more powerful than a stateless warden in many ways. It
keeps track of the previous messages and compares all new messages against
a list of previous messages. This makes catching hidden content easier as the
warden is not matching against a list of definitions but against previous states
of the protocol.
8Can be undetectable if discarded id’s are used to send other clients messages.
9This attribute was removed from StegMPP as it was detectable even by a stateless warden.
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Covert Channel Stateless
Warden
Stateful
Warden
Presence of type Attribute no yes
Value of ID Attribute no yes8
Presence of xml:lang Attribute no yes
Leading Space no no
Trailing Space no no
Case of type attribute9 yes yes
Table 1: Covert channels and their detectability.
Channel Entropy Difference
Control 4.976370
Presence of type Attribute 4.974257 -0.002113
Value of ID Attribute 4.980152 0.003782
Presence of xml:lang Attribute 4.989826 0.013456
Leading Space 4.975970 -0.000400
Trailing Space 4.975430 -0.000940
Table 2: Comparison of entropy of covert channels.
5 Results
The results of simulating both types of warden show that most of the channels
implemented by StegMPP are immune to detection by a stateless warden. It also
shows that some of these channels can be detected by a carefully crafted stateful
warden. However implementing a stateful warden to monitor all the connections
on a busy XMPP server is not trivial and requires significant computational
resources and being able to deal with a potentially very high number of false
positives.
Table 1 on page 10 lists the covert channels (each hiding one bit per message)
tested, and their security against both stateless and stateful wardens.
5.1 Statistical Analysis
We used ent, a tool implementing a battery of statistical tests, to compute the
entropy per byte and find whether there were statistically significant differences
between a normal (clean) XMPP session and one with covert channels being
employed to exchange some data. The results of this analysis can be found in
Table 2 on page 10.
A detailed inspection of Table 2 clearly reveals that any statistical steganal-
ysis of the proposed techniques based on entropic measures would have to be
extremely precise due to the minuscule differences between the values corre-
sponding to the clean (Control) exchange and the rest of the hidden ones.
An additional indication of this difficulty can be observed in the fact that not
always the entropy corresponding to the channels with hidden contents is higher
that that of the clean one. This is frequently the case in different steganographic
settings, but in here we have alternating signs in the last column (Difference).
That said, these figures also show that the covert channel based on the pres-
ence of xml:lang attribute seems to be orders of magnitude easier to detect than
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the rest, so its usage cannot be recommended in high security environments.
This, by itself, is of course no proof of security, but at least shows that the
techniques proposed in this article and implemented in the accompanying tool
modify the cover media only very slightly, giving us some indication that any
future entropy based steganalysis will need large amounts of data and compu-
tational power to succeed.
6 Conclusion
A new method for steganographic communications using XMPP is proposed for
the first time in this work. A number of new and promising covert channels are
discussed in detail. Most of these channels take advantage of the redundancy
in the underlying protocol, instead of the contents of the message. Simulations
show that most of these channels can go undetected by a stateless warden, but
may be detected by a stateful warden. We in addition propose some subtle ways
to harden a subset of these channels against attacks by stateful wardens.
Our proof of concept tool, StegMPP, comes with many of the proposed
functionalities described in this paper, and is freely available for download at:
http://patuck.github.io/StegMPP/
6.1 Future Works
In order to develop a more secure implementation, we propose further research
into how to harden steganalysis for a stateful warden. One of the ways we
may be able to accomplish this is by alternating the channels we use in each
message. We believe this idea is promising and plan to study it in more detail
in the near future. We would also like to find a way to improve the efficiency
of a stateful warden capable of detecting these covert channels, and develop a
steganalytic tool to detect the presence of hidden messages in XMPP messages.
This tool could potentially be of use to institutions, large corporations and
governmental organisations, particularly for early detection of insider threats
and data leakages.
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